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1   Introduction 
On 14 March 1960, the Bulgarian engineer Zlatan Zlatarov noted in his diary: 
Now, after four years of hard work as technical manager of the construction site of the 
copper factory G. Damjanov in Pirdop, I reported at my new work place – the metallurgi-
cal plant Kremikovci. Already some years ago, there was talk about the construction of 
this giant of our ferrous industry and I yearned for the day, when I would start work at its 
construction. I was looking back on almost ten years of construction work as technical 
manager, exclusively on national construction sites – the railway lines Loveč-Trojan, die 
Lower-Balkan Railway Line, the copper factory in Pirdop, and others. 
So, together with the technical manager of the group, Ljako Marinov and the boarding 
foremen Jordan Docov, and together with engineer Delčo Gjurov, we were the first con-
struction workers here, who laid the foundations of the factory in Kremikovci. 
It was a fortunate twist of fate that my first working day here coincided with the laying 
of the first stone of the metallurgical plant in Kremikovci. 
The work was tense and exhausting yet fruitful. We managed to do a lot for the prepara-
tion of the superstructure work. After this hard day of work we returned together with brig-
adier Jordan Docov back in our barrack, which was “generously” provided by Transtroj, the 
factory developer. We now used it as our living space. We had to think about the equipment 
of this place because there could not be any word of “living conditions” yet. The room, 
which we had to furnish, was three times three meters in size. There was only enough space 
for two beds and one chair, which served also as table. Yet, only that one who had never be-
fore worked on a construction site would complain about such inconveniences, which are 
the companion of the construction worker, especially the first ones. 
And so … the first day of the building of the Kremikovci steel plant passed by. I laid 
down in my hard bed and imagined that in the next years, in this endless plain, hundreds 
of machines would resound, that thousands of construction workers would come and that 
joint efforts would build factory halls and mills, that the chimneys would smoke and the 
gigantic heart of the Kremikovci steel plant, which I have seen so far only on plans, 
would beat – yet, let’s see what tomorrow will bring.1 
                                                 
1 The diary is kept by the “Ivan Hadžijski” Institute at Gallup Sofia, doc. no. 1011. 
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Zlatarov put down these lines about his first day of work in Kremikovci in his diary. On 
the following pages, he describes the construction of the steel plant, which would become 
the single largest industrial enterprise in socialist Bulgaria. Despite backbreaking work and 
awful living conditions, his enthusiasm for the project did not faint. He was a real exempli-
fication of the ideal worker as imagined by the communist regime, although not even being 
a party member: hard working, ready to sacrifice himself for a greater good – the industrial-
ization of Bulgaria and the building of socialism. He articulated his experience and expec-
tations with the tropes of official ideology setting his eyes clearly on a bright future. 
To take a diary at face value would be naïve, of course. Yet, there is no indication 
that Zlatan Zlatarov wrote these lines for anybody else than himself. The diary was nev-
er published and is today kept in a private archive in Sofia. The language, which the 
author uses, resembles official rhetoric. His unclouded optimism and astonishing ability 
to look over obvious shortcomings in the present make the reader suspicious: is it possi-
ble that someone really internalized communist ideology to the extent that he spoke 
Bolshevik – to paraphrase Stephen Kotkin2 – even to himself? Is this a case of self-
duplicity, of double speak in a closed circuit? Or does this diary reflect real enthusiasm 
of a technical worker who cherished the creation of heavy industry in socialist Bulgaria 
and took pride from the fact that he was part of the modernization of the country? 
For the expression of his feelings, Zlatarov used the language that was there at the mo-
ment. The use of the ideological tropes rendered his own experiences meaningful and 
helped him to connect his personal fate with larger historical forces.3 He was devoted to his 
                                                 
2 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain. 
3 Research on Soviet diary writing, which is much better developed than on any other formerly 
socialist country, points to the internalization of official tropes and the writing of the self in terms that 
connect with the ideological foundations of the system, be it the ideal person as envisioned by 
Stalinism or the fear of war nurtured in the post-war period. See Hellbeck, “Fashioning the Stalinist 
soul”; Hellbeck, Revolution on my mind; Paperno, Stories of the Soviet experience, esp. 142 passim. 
Oral history research on memories of socialism has also shown that many interviewees, for situating 
themselves in society and creating subjectivity, use salient category of socialist differentiation and 
group ascription, such as [being] “a worker from a poor family”, [coming] “from a poor peasant 
background”, [being] a “diligent worker” etc. See Wierling, “Dominante scripts und komplizierte 
Lebensgeschichten“, 324; for empirical examples from Bulgaria see: Koleva et al., Slŭnceto na zalez 
pak sreštu men, 120, 178, 208, 224 and 234. 
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work and to building industry, and he praised diligence and commitment. He felt that his 
participation in socialist Bulgarian society was a success and that he contributed to the suc-
cess of Bulgaria. He shared these values with the communist regime, which, therefore, ap-
peared as a legitimate one in his eyes, although there are no indications in his diary that he 
cared for any other aspect of communist ideology. The communist regime relied on people 
such as Zlatarov: first, it needed their labor and technical expertise for industrialization and 
modernization. Second, such workers manifested the ability of the communist regime to 
link its ideological claims to pre-existing popular values and attitudes, such as notions of 
hard work, progress, self-reliance, education, and endurance. 
Research on post-socialist memories of (formerly) industrial workers confirms that 
workers at least to some extent have internalized elements of communist ideology. In inter-
views they often articulate their position through notions and images once promoted by 
communist power. Tanja Petrović, for example, in her study of the social memory of work-
ers in a once large cable factory in the Serbian town of Jagodina, alludes to the importance 
of the concept of “modernity” in the reflections of workers about post-socialist develop-
ment. The workers she interviewed felt that under socialism, they had been part of moder-
nity, while after socialism their whole country became more backward and less European 
than it had used to be. So, the pivotal claim of the Yugoslav communists to build modernity 
had found eager recipients and participants.4 No wonder that these workers also nostalgi-
cally remember the Yugoslav idea of “Brotherhood and Unity”, which they contrast with 
the catastrophic consequences of the politics of nationalism.5 In her research on the 
memory of workers in a Slovenian textile mill, Nina Vodopivec came to similar conclu-
sions. Workers remembered socialism as the “good old days” and rendered their current 
life meaningful by relying on categories that come from socialism.6 Analyzing shop-floor 
relations in a Sofia based glass factory Dimitra Kofti also found out that the workers de-
                                                 
4 Petrović, “When We Were Europe”, 141. 
5 Ibid, 131. 
6 Vodopivec, “Past for the Present”, 226–7. 
IOS Mitteilung No. 62 
 
 4
scribed their situation today “often through the lens of communist practices.”7 The concept 
of work is salient in workers’ memories, which is clearly a result of the fact that under 
communism, “work served as the basic determinant of what constituted a loyal and re-
spectable socialist citizen.”8 
Yet, despite the obvious importance of state socialism for workers, and of workers 
for state socialism, and despite the heavy weight of the communist legacy on the (for-
mer) workers’ habitus and their memories today, we know relatively little about work-
ers under communism in the Balkans. The project which this working paper describes 
wants to help filling this void. It aims at a comparative study of shop floor practices and 
labor relations in two major industrial enterprises in the communist Balkans: the steel 
mills in Kremikovci near Sofia in Bulgaria and in Elbasan in central Albania. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Kofti, “Everything has changed” – “Everything is the same”, 20 [unpublished paper]. 
8 Massino, “Gender, Identity and Work Under State Socialism”, 133. 
Workers, Steel Factories, and Communism 
 5
2   The research project “Industrial Workers’ Cultures in the 
     Balkans during State Socialism” 
Modernization and industrialization were among the pivotal goals of the communist 
regimes in Southeastern Europe. The challenges which they faced were comparable to 
those of the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution: when communists took power in 
the Balkans, they did so in largely rural societies, where the single most sizeable social 
group were peasants (mostly smallholders). The working class, in contrast, was small 
and dispersed. So, the “dictatorship of the proletariat” was forced to create a “socialist” 
working class in the first place. Hence the nature of the emerging industrial working 
class was tied to the structures of communist power in the Balkans from the very begin-
ning. This was a marked difference – with important consequences for shop-floor rela-
tions – to the East Central European countries, especially Czechoslovakia, the Soviet 
Zone of Occupation / GDR, but also Hungary and Poland, where a relatively large and 
sometimes well organized industrial workforce was already in place when the com-
munists took power. Peter Heumos, for example, showed how difficult it was for the 
Czechoslovak communists in the late 1940s and early 1950s to implement Stalinist 
campaigns for the increase of production, such as shock-work and socialist competition. 
These measures were detested by a proud working class that had been socialized in a 
unionized, social-democratic industrial milieu.9 Mark Pittaway comments that “Eastern 
and especially Central European workers had powerful preexisting working-class cul-
tures, values, and aspirations which clashed sharply with notions underpinning Com-
munist party attempts to reshape workers in their own image.”10 This was a noted dif-
ference to the Balkans, where such traditional working class strongholds were almost 
totally missing with few local exceptions.  
                                                 
9 Heumos, “Betriebsräte, Einheitsgewerkschaft und staatliche Unternehmensverwaltung”; Heumos, 
“Zum Verhalten von Arbeitern in industriellen Konflikten”; Heumos, ‘Vyhrňme si rukávy, než se kola 
zastaví!’; Heumos, “Grenzen des Sozialistischen Produktivismus”; Heumos, “State Socialism, Egali-
tarianism, Collectivism”. 
10 Pittaway, “Introduction: Workers and Socialist States in Postwar Central and Eastern Europe”, 5. 
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Bulgaria and Albania can illustrate the Southeast European pattern, while at the same 
time they display important differences. In both countries, the industrial working class 
was miniscule – in the Albanian case, almost non-existent – when the communists took 
power in 1944 / 5. Bulgaria registered some 90,000 industrial workers in 1945, many of 
them in small, hardly mechanized workshops.11 In Albania, there was no industrial 
working class to speak of at all. In 1950, the share of people employed in industry, min-
ing and construction amounted to 7.0 percent of the workforce in Albania and 11.4 per-
cent in Bulgaria in 1950, according to the official data.12 Yet, in both countries, the rul-
ing communists aimed at achieving industrialization. As a matter of fact, Bulgaria and 
Albania experienced rapid industrialization under communist rule, though in Albania to 
a lesser extent than in Bulgaria. By 1989, 45.3 percent of the Bulgarian workforce 
worked in industry which made this country one of the most industrialized ones in the 
world. Industry and mining contributed almost 60 percent to the gross domestic product 
of Bulgaria by the end of communist rule. In Albania, according to official and probably 
inflated figures, 31.0 percent of the workforce was employed in industry, mining and 
construction by the end of the 1980s.13 The lower share of industrial employment in 
Albania was the result of strict restrictions on rural-urban mobility. The Albanian com-
munists had put in place forceful administrative measures to limit the rural exodus (see 
below), and in their pursuit of total autarky they placed more emphasis on retaining a 
large farming population.14 So, Bulgaria and Albania stand also for different ways of 
economic policy under communism. 
Despite differences in the speed and intensity of industrial development in Bulgar-
ia and Albania, both countries displayed a number of similarities in their industriali-
zation effort. In both countries – such as in most other communist countries – the 
state prioritized heavy industry over light industry, with notorious consequences for 
                                                 
11 Vladigerov, Ikonomičesko i socialno razvitie na Narodna Republika Bŭlgarija, 44. 
12 Brunnbauer, “Gesellschaft und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Südosteuropa nach 1945”, 669. It goes 
without saying that communist statistics are not the most reliable source of information. 
13 Ibid, 668–9. 
14 Sjöberg, “Rural Retention in Albania”. 
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the provision of the population with consumer goods. Heavy industry received the 
bulk of state investment because economic planners thought that only capital industry 
would lay durable foundations of a modern economy by producing the goods neces-
sary for infrastructure development and further industrialization. As Katherine 
Verdery put it “Socialist regimes wanted not just eggs but the goose that lays them.”15 
The concentration of resources in heavy industry created significant imbalances in the 
economy as a whole which contributed to the economic malaise of state socialism. It 
had also salient consequences for the nature of the workforce and its internal differen-
tiation: factories in heavy industry employed more people and formed a micro-cosmos 
within socialist society; they wielded more political influence and, therefore, were 
more successful in soliciting scarce resources from the state authorities. Workers in 
heavy industry received higher wages and were more sought after; that is why they 
had more room for maneuver than, for example, female workers in the textile indus-
try. It is important to note that the size of an industrial enterprise did matter greatly 
not only for economic but also for social reasons. Companies in state socialism were 
not only employers, and factories not only a place where people worked, but they 
played a significant role for the organization of social life. Many social benefits, such 
as housing, places in vacation homes, educational opportunities, cultural and other 
leisurely activities, were distributed and organized through the employer and not the 
state directly. To work in a large, politically powerful enterprise which enjoyed privi-
leged investment provision, thus, meant concrete benefits for the workers. 
Our project does not aim at a detailed reconstruction of economic policies and in-
dustrial development. We rather take the post-1945 industrialization drive and the 
concomitant rise of a working class as point of departure for the analysis of industrial 
labor relations under communism. We are interested in practices and relations on the 
shop-floor and the attitudes of workers towards work and their relations with man-
agement and the party-state. We want to reconstruct the social differences among the 
workers and their accommodation with the communist system. These questions will 
                                                 
15 Verdery, What was socialism, and what comes next?, 26. 
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be studied by two case studies: the “Brežnev Metallurgical Complex” in Kremikovci 
in Bulgaria and the “Steel of the Party” steel mill in Elbasan, Albania. Both steel fac-
tories were the single largest industrial enterprises in their country with enormous 
economic but also political significance. 
The heuristic value of these two case studies lies in their being a micro-cosmos of 
social relations in state socialism. We depart from the assumption that the salient pat-
terns of economic and social organization, but also of cultural and societal policies of 
the communist regimes are reflected in the relations at the workplace and between 
workers and management in these two steel mills. The two enterprises were sites of 
the construction of communism. They stand for its ideology but also for the divergent 
social results that came out of policy measures. Such as other large-scale sites of the 
building of socialism – in a literal and metaphorical way – the steel plants in 
Kremikovci and Elbasan were over-determined by various and sometimes conflicting 
symbolic ascriptions.16 They were intended to become molders of the “New Man” and 
of the communist soul, while at the same time they had to fulfill functions essential to 
the economies of Albania and Bulgaria. The communists ascribed huge ideological 
importance onto the two factories and invested a lot of political as well as financial 
capital to make these intentions true. Enver Hoxha even called the construction of the 
Elbasan steel plant a “second liberation” of Albania, after the first one by the com-
munist partisans in World War Two. The names of the factories carried a lot of sym-
bolic meaning as well: In 1982, after the death of the long-time General Secretary of 
the Communist Part of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brežnev, who had worked in the iron 
and steel industry, the Kremikovci plant took his name. This choice of name alluded 
to the close relationship between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. The name “Steel of 
the Party,” given to the factory in Elbasan, highlighted the role of the party and its 
claims at heroism, steadfastness and strength. The symbolic meaning of the factories 
would eventually outweigh their economic rationale: the “Brežnev Metallurgical 
Complex” in Kremikovci and the “Steel of Party” mill in Elbasan were essentially 
Workers, Steel Factories, and Communism 
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poetic endeavors. A business or economic history point of view, therefore, cannot 
fully appreciate their political, social and cultural significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kremikovci Elbasan 
 
                                                 
16 Cf. Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain; Gestwa, Die Stalinschen Großbauten des Kommunismus. 
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3   Industrial workers in state socialism 
While the history of industrial workers under communism in Southeastern Europe has 
attracted limited interest, we can build on a significant body of scholarship on workers’ 
history in state socialism in other countries. The main thrust in this literature is the rela-
tionship between workers and the party-state which – according to most accounts – was 
ambiguous. Peter Heumos succinctly concluded on this issue that  
Cooperation with the political system could coexist with actions that could be described 
as deviant, just as accommodation and the pursuit of individual interests could reinforce 
conformity. Patterns of behavior that were unambiguous were only found occasionally.17 
The spread of the geographic focus of research on “socialist workers” is very uneven. This 
is a pity because each state socialist society possessed its idiosyncratic features. The varia-
tions neither in time nor in place have been sufficiently explored. In terms of place, we 
know most about workers in the Soviet Union and the GDR, two arguably and for differ-
ent reasons very specific cases. As for the Soviet Union, the development of the industrial 
working class and industrial relations in the 1920s and 1930s have been in the center of 
the attention of labor history; that is, the periods of the relatively liberal Novaia 
ekonomičeskaia politika (New Economic Policies) and of forced industrialization under 
Stalin.18 There is much less research on workers in the Soviet post-war and especially the 
post-Stalinist period.19 The history of workers in the GDR has found extensive treatment 
as well, for example by the voluminous collection “Arbeiter in der SBZ – DDR” or  
in Christoph Klessmann’s similarly exhaustive “Arbeiter im Arbeiterstaat”.20 In her  
                                                 
17 Heumos, “State Socialism, Egalitarianism, Collectivism”, 47; cf. Pittaway, “Introduction: Workers and 
Socialist States in Postwar Central and Eastern Europeˮ, 1. 
18 Filtzer, Soviet workers and Stalinist industrialization; Filtzer, Soviet workers and de-Stalinization; Filtzer, 
Labour and the Contradictions of Soviet Planning under Stalin; Filtzer, “Labor Discipline, the Use of Work 
Time, and the Decline of the Soviet System, 1928–1991; Filtzer, “The standard of living of Soviet industrial 
workers in the immediate postwar period, 1945–1948ˮ; Filtzer, Soviet workers and late Stalinism; Filtzer,  
A dream deferred; Kotkin, Magnetic mountain; Chase, Workers, society, and the Soviet state. 
19 A notable exception is Donald Filtzer (Filtzer, Soviet workers and Stalinist industrialization). The impact 
of perestroika on workers has found more attention, though mainly from a political (science) point of view. 
20 Hübner, Klessmann and Tenfelde,  Arbeiter im Staatssozialismus; Kleßmann, Arbeiter im ‘Arbeiterstaat’ DDR. 
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comparative study of different industrial enterprises in the GDR Jeannette Madarász has 
pointed to the significance of the political relevance of a factory: its place in the hierarchy 
of investment allocation and the ability of its director to exploit networks had direct con-
sequences for the situation of its workers.21 
Research on workers in other state-socialist countries is sketchier and owes a lot to 
individual efforts, such as Peter Heumos’ explorations of the relationship between 
communist power and industrial workers in Czechoslovakia or late Mark Pittaway’s 
interest in the accommodation of workers with the socialist system in Hungary.22 There 
is especially a lack in genuinely comparative studies.23 Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast’s ex-
ploration of the steel mills in Nowa Huta (Poland), in Eisenhüttenstadt (GDR) and Os-
trava (Czechoslovakia), in which she deals also with the situation of the workers, is a 
notable exception,24 Mark Pittaway’s cross-regional perspective another.25 
A very productive thread in the research on the social history of state socialism, 
which offers important insights also into workers’ history, has been the exploration of 
new “socialist” cities. Stephen Kotkin’s now classic study on the “Magnetic Moun-
tain”,26 which is a histoire total of the construction of the new Soviet industrial city of 
Magnitogorsk south of the Ural Mountains, was followed by investigations of the so-
cial, cultural and economic developments of other “socialist” cities as well: Nowa Huta 
in Poland,27 Sztálinváros / Dunaújváros in Hungary,28 Stalinstadt / Eisenhüttenstatt in the 
                                                 
21 Madarász, Working in East Germany. 
22 For Heumos see references in footnote 9; Pittaway, “Workers, Management and the State in Socialist 
Hungaryˮ; Pittaway, “Accomodation and the Limits of Economic Reformˮ; International Labor and 
Working-Class History, vol. 68 (2005), special issue on “Workers and Socialist States in Postwar Central 
and Eastern Europe”; Pittaway, The workers’ state. 
23 An important edited volumes with contributions on different countries is Hübner, Klessmann and 
Tenfelde, Arbeiter im Staatssozialismus. 
24 Jajeśniak-Quast, “Die sozialistische Planstadt Eisenhüttenstadt im Vergleich mit Nowa Huta und 
Ostrava-Kunčice”, Jajeśniak-Quast, Stahlgiganten in der sozialistischen Transformation. 
25 Pittaway, “Introduction: Workers and Socialist States in Postwar Central and Eastern Europeˮ. 
26 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain. 
27 Lebow, “Socialist Leisure in Time and Spaceˮ; Janus, “Labor’s Paradiseˮ. 
28 Horváth, A kapu és a határ; Horváth, “Alltag in Sztálinvárosˮ. 
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GDR,29 and Dimitrovgrad in Bulgaria.30 These towns were not only connected with the 
important goal to create a heavy industry base for the socialist economy but they were 
considered by the communists also a hotbed of the New Man, the ultimate goal of 
communist societal policy. One common theme of these explorations is the significant 
gulf between political intentions and socio-cultural as well as economic results: alt-
hough these new cities and their industries31 enjoyed privileged resource allocation and 
were places of major ideological investment, the social and cultural practices diverged 
from the communist blue print of the New Man (and Woman). The party had hoped to 
see the emergence of self-sacrificing builders of socialism. Yet, social life in these plac-
es was characterized by a myriad of practices that in the eyes of the communist rulers 
were often deviant. The cities and industries also mirrored general shortcomings of 
communist planning, evident for example in severe housing shortages and problems in 
labor discipline. Another important finding of these studies on new “socialist” cities is 
the fact that these places became characterized by new forms of social inequality. 
Communist policies produced new mechanisms of social exclusion while at the same 
time providing avenues of social advancement for certain segments of the population. 
However, the failure of communist regimes to render social relations and cultural 
practices a mirror image of their ideology does not mean that political interventions did 
not leave traces in collective identities and loyalties. The impact of party politics and of 
ideology, therefore, must not be neglected. On the one hand, there were certain ele-
ments of communist ideology – such as the appraisal of work – which were accepted by 
workers; on the other hand, the workers learnt how to navigate the constraints of the 
system by learning to speak “Bolshevik.” This is how Stephen Kotkin put it: “Life in 
Magnitogorsk taught cynicism as well as labor enthusiasm, fear as well as pride. Most 
of all, life in Magnitogorsk taught one how to identify oneself and speak in the accepta-
                                                 
29 Jajeśniak-Quast, Stahlgiganten in der sozialistischen Transformation. 
30 Brunnbauer, “ ‘The Town of the Youth’: Dimitrovgrad and Bulgarian Socialism”. 
31 With the exception of Dimitrovgrad in Bulgaria, which became a center of chemical industry, the other 
‘socialist’ cities were shaped by the steel industry. 
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ble terms.”32 The acceptance of communist concepts for individual identification is also 
evident in contemporaneous autobiographies of workers and in their letters to the  
authorities in which they framed their self in terms that were meaningful to the power-
holders.33 
A core question in the research of workers’ history under state socialism is the im-
pact of party dictatorship upon the workplace and upon shop-floor relations. Contem-
porary research refutes both the notion that workers were just cogs in a gigantic cog-
wheel, nor that the “dictatorship of the proletariat” has brought liberation from aliena-
tion; neither does recent research portray workers as being in constant opposition to 
the communist regime. The relationship between workers and party-state are rather 
described in terms of a “complex dynamic of consent, accommodation and appropria-
tion as much as by resistance.”34 The intricate issue of labor discipline is a case in 
point for the fact that any dichotomous conceptualizations are misplaced. Many re-
searchers highlight the apparent paradox that, on the one hand, labor codes and labor 
policies were strict and often repressive; on the other hand, party, government and 
enterprise documents are full with reports about slack labor discipline, frequent ab-
senteeism, drinking at the workplace, and insubordinate workers. Even though during 
Stalinism violations of factory discipline were part of the criminal code, and many 
workers were sent to the GULAG or otherwise repressed for coming late, causing 
machine breakdowns, or stealing property of the factory, the communists appear to 
have been on the losing side in their struggle for increased labor productivity and dis-
cipline. Neither punishment and propaganda, nor material incentives seemed to help: 
industrial workers displayed a high degree of “Eigen-Sinn” (self-will)35 which mani-
fested itself also in a lack of discipline. 
                                                 
32 Kotkin, Magentic Mountain, 237. 
33 See Friedman, “Furtive Selves”. 
34 Pittaway, “Introduction: Workers and Socialist States in Postwar Central and Eastern Europe,” 3. 
35 Cf. Lüdtke, Herrschaft als soziale Praxis. 
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Already in 1982, Charles Sabel and David Stark provided a plausible answer to the 
apparent puzzle, why workers under a dictatorial and overtly interventionist regime and 
despite harsh labor codes and the non-existence of independent trade unions, enjoyed a 
surprisingly large room of maneuver: full employment – which was an important politi-
cal-ideological promise of the communists that they hardly wanted to betray – had cre-
ated a tremendous need of labor, which forced enterprises to accept ‘deviant’ practices 
of the workers because workers could threaten the management to leave. State socialist 
economies were economies of shortage, and labor was one of the scarce production fac-
tors. Such as with other supplies, many companies pursued a strategy of hording: they 
employed more people than they would normally need for maintaining regular produc-
tion, just to have enough workers at those – rare – moments when they received the 
necessary materials in order to meet their production goals as specified by the plan. 
Workers knew that the management depended on them, and managers knew that if they 
did not meet production figures they would face sanctions or lose their job. The perma-
nent lack of workers constituted a risk for the managers and a chance for the workers. 
Workers gained bargaining power on the workplace and vis-à-vis their superiors, re-
gardless of the fact that trade-unions were relatively toothless and rarely stood up 
against the party.36 Kotkin makes a similar point: 
The state policy of full employment further reinforced workers’ leverage. Workers discov-
ered that in the absence of unemployment or a ‘reserve army,’ managers and especially 
foremen under severe pressure to meet obligations could become accommodating. What  
resulted could be called a kind of equal but nonetheless real codependency.37 
This mechanism seems to have been in place in all European state-socialist countries 
once they had reached full employment. The only notable exception is Yugoslavia, 
where officially recognized unemployment became a permanent feature of socio-
economic life in the mid-1960s and grew to very high numbers in the 1980s (with sig-
                                                 
36 Sabel and Stark, “Planning, Politics, and Shop-Floor Power”, 451; Heumos, “State Socialism, 
Egalitarianism, Collectivism”, 51 and 54. 
37 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 224. 
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nificant differences between the republics and provinces).38 Unfortunately, there is prac-
tically no new historical research on the situation of industrial workers in socialist Yu-
goslavia (in contrast, for example, to the topic of workers’ memory of socialism, which 
draws scholarly interest). Yet, the fact that Yugoslavia recorded a high number of usual-
ly localized strikes and walkouts can be seen as an indicator for the fact that the rela-
tions between workers and management were different from other state socialist coun-
tries. It was not only unemployment that constituted a difference: Yugoslav workers 
enjoyed “self-management,” which was introduced by law in 1950 and became one of 
the pillars of Yugoslavia’s claim to a distinctive path towards socialism. This was not 
mere window-dressing. Workers had more say in company related matters than in other 
state socialist (and for that matter, capitalist) countries.39 The other major difference 
which must have had an impact on relations on the workplace was the opportunity of 
Yugoslav workers to take up work abroad. In 1963 / 4 the Yugoslav government permit-
ted temporary emigration abroad for the purpose of taking work. Until 1973 / 4, when the 
Western European countries declared a stop on recruitment of Yugoslav emigrant work-
ers, up to one million workers left Yugoslavia.40 It seems a reasonable but yet to be test-
ed hypothesis that the opportunity to go abroad and the relatively strong position of 
workers in the “self-managed” enterprises in Yugoslavia had similar consequences for 
shop-floor relations like full employment in the other state socialist economies. 
An important economic result of full employment and the general need for workers 
was the high rate of labor turn-over in state socialist societies. Sabel and Stark point to 
frequent complaints by party leaders that so many workers changed their job, especially 
young and well-qualified ones who easily found another job with better pay or lighter 
norms and better working conditions.41 The opportunity to get employment somewhere 
else was a major bargaining chip of workers vis-à-vis their employer. Katharyne Mitchell 
                                                 
38 Woodward, Socialist umemployment. 
39 Höpken, “Sozialismus und Pluralismus in Jugoslawien”. 
40 Baučič, “Some economic consequences of Yugoslav external migrations”. 
41 Sabel and Stark, “Planning, Politics, and Shop-Floor Power”, 452. 
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notes in a 1992 paper that in the Soviet Union in the 1970s, approximately 20 percent of all 
workers changed their job in each year. They were mostly young and qualified. Mitchell 
also emphasizes that there were significant differences in the rate of labor turn-over accord-
ing to region, industry, level of qualification, age and political engagement of the work-
ers.42 Neither the Soviet nor the other ruling communists managed to curtail labor turnover 
with administrative measure. One reason for that failure was the practice of the manage-
ments of enterprises in need of workers to directly recruit workers from somewhere  
else.43 Dagmara Jajeśnik-Quandt, for example, shows how the steel mill in Stalinstadt / 
Eisenhüttenstadt lost workers to other industrial enterprises, despite its prominent ideologi-
cal and political position in the GDR. Yet, other factories would offer better working condi-
tions (e.g., no night shifts, physically less exhaustive jobs) or were located in more attrac-
tive places, so that they were able to recruit workers from one of the presumed flagships of 
GDR industry.44 Rates of labor turnover could reach astronomic dimensions, especially in 
the early years of socialist construction: The steel mill in Nowa Huta hired 4,928 workers 
in the first five months of 1955, while 4,306 left the enterprise during the same time.45 
However, as Mitchell’s data on the 1970s’ Soviet Union show, turnover would remain on a 
high level also in the years after the initial built-up of industry. In Bulgaria as well, labor 
turnover was a major characteristic of industry: in 1981, the rate was twenty-nine percent.46 
It goes without saying that the discontinuity of the workforce had detrimental effects on 
production and qualification levels. It was one important reason why the communist re-
gimes never achieved their goals with respect to professional training of workers. 
The particular bargaining power of workers shaped relations also within an enterprise. 
The management often sought ways to retain workers, especially qualified personnel, and 
to tie them to the factory. One way was to offer higher wages, which however was a lim-
ited option because wages were usually centrally set. Yet, the management could decree 
                                                 
42 Mitchell, “Work Authority in Industryˮ, 688. 
43 Sabel and Stark, “Planning, Politics, and Shop-Floor Powerˮ, 453. 
44 Jajeśniak-Quast, Stahlgiganten in der sozialistischen Transformation, 130. 
45 Ibid, 135. 
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lighter norms, often in conflict with central planners who preferred higher, “scientifically” 
established norms.47 Management also often turned a blind eye on violations of labor dis-
cipline, such as showing up too late or leaving too early, drinking on the job, etc. It should 
be noted that absenteeism was often caused by unpredictable public transportation and the 
need to queue for basic consumer goods, and not a result of laziness. Enterprises that en-
joyed privileged access to state investments could offer non-financial incentives as well, 
such as better housing, vacation homes in attractive touristic areas, cultural, sports and 
other leisurely facilities for their workers, etc. The provision of welfare benefits through 
enterprises can be seen as an attempt of the communist regime to territorialize citizenship 
rights and thereby prevent mobility and create loyalty of workers to their enterprise.48 The 
frequent organization of enterprise festivities was another attempt by the management to 
foster among the workers bonds of attachment with their work place. While politico-
ideological speeches were an inevitable component of these festivities, workers do seem 
to have enjoyed them, though for more mundane reasons, i.e., for the availability of food 
and drinks as well as the chance to take a day off.49 The workers practiced, in John Scott’s 
term, a “counter appropriation” of an action that management had thought to use for in-
creasing control over them.50 This does not contradict information from oral history that 
the core workforce of an enterprise identified with it.51 
Another area where managers had leeway to make concession was the acceptance of 
informal practices. They often turned a blind eye on the wide-spread practice of workers 
to appropriate resources of their enterprise for moonlighting. These resources included 
not only material items (tools and machines, primary materials for production) but also 
work time. Informal relations permeated all walks of socialist society, and informal 
economic activities were essential for maintaining at least a modicum of stability and to 
                                                 
46 Lampe, The Bulgarian economy in the twentieth century, 161. 
47 For an example of such a conflict see Sabel and Stark, “Planning, Politics, and Shop-Floor Powerˮ, 455–6. 
48 Dičev, “Usjadaneto na nomadskija komunizămˮ; Tóth, “Shifting Identities in the Life Histories”. 
49 Petrov, “Sozialistische Arbeitsfeiern im Betrieb”, 161. 
50 Quoted in Lüdtke, “Einleitung: Herrschaft als soziale Praxis”, 49. 
51 E. g. Tóth, “Shifting Identities in the Life Histories”, 87. 
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put the available economic resources to use. Hence, party leaderships often accepted 
these arrangements even if they ran counter to their claim of rationally organizing socie-
ty and planning economy. The work-place was a fundament of such informal networks. 
Access to networks and resources became a major factor in the differentiation of the 
working class (and of wider society).52 
So, workers were not completely powerless in contrast to what has often been suggest-
ed by Western observers during the Cold War. Workers played an active role in the for-
mation of the state-socialist system. Yet, the literature on workers under communism does 
not paint a rosy picture either. It stresses the many material and political constraints under 
which workers (and other members of socialist society) lived and worked. The relation-
ship between communist rulers and workers was difficult from the very beginning, be-
cause established industrial workers opposed certain policy measures of the new re-
gimes.53 The well known examples of labor unrest – such in the GDR and Czechoslovakia 
in 1953, in Poland and Hungary in 1956, in Romania in 1971 and 1987, and the 
Solidarność movement – are evidence of the significant gap between workers’ aspirations 
and their lived realities. These manifestations of workers discontent often forced the party 
to offer concessions and to improve living and working conditions. Mark Pittaway 
stressed the “workerism” of communist regimes after the labor upheavals in the mid-
1950s, which at least for some time stabilized the system and secured workers rising liv-
ing standards. So, workers through mass action forced policy changes. The regime’s at-
tempts to accommodate the industrial working class and to safeguard its earnings – espe-
cially of its male, skilled elite – “resulted in tacit acceptance by the regime of the informal 
patterns of workplace bargaining, which had sprung up between workers and management 
(…).”54 This policy undermined regime and management efforts to raise productivity in 
the long-term. In Hungary, for example the workerism of the regime created a new sense 
of entitlement among the skilled workers, which the workers perceived to be jeopardized 
                                                 
52 Pittaway, “Accomodation and the Limits of Economic Reform”, 462–3. 
53 Ibid, 2; see Kenney, Rebuilding Poland. 
54 Pittaway, Eastern Europe 1939–2000, 68. 
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when the Hungarian communists introduced market-oriented reforms in the late 1960s. 
These reforms were, thus, met with “a wave of working-class protest. (…) Some [work-
ers] felt alienated by what they saw as a new managerialism in industry.”55 Hungarian 
workers also resented the increased materialism manifest in the economic reforms.56 
Hence, the attitudes of the working class were a factor with which communists had to 
reckon when introducing economic reforms. The large miners’ strike in the Jiu Valley in 
Romania in August 1971 is a case in point: a new law that brought a number of reductions 
in social benefits marked the end of a tacit ‘deal’ between regime and workers. The walk-
out in the Jiu mine was even successful in the short time, because Ceauşescu personally 
came to the miners and promised to accept their demands. Only later did the state clamp 
down on the organizers of the protest.57 In post-1968 Czechoslovakia and the GDR – two 
other regimes which resisted political liberalization – system stability depended to a large 
degree on the material concessions granted by the party-state to the workers; at least as 
long as the tacit social contract of foregoing political liberties in exchange for social bene-
fits, consumer choices, tranquility and a relatively relaxed labor regime could be main-
tained.58 Bulgaria broadly falls into this pattern as well. Even the Albanian regime took 
measures to appease workers, such as by reducing prices and wage differences and by 
creating “workers’ control committees” in factories.59  
Workers, thus, were not pawns in the socialist chess play but actors with their own 
agendas, hopes and expectations. Their room for maneuver and bargaining power 
nevertheless remained dependent on the bureaucratic decisions of the rulers, upon 
which they usually had only a mediate influence at best. The workers’ situation was 
connected to the institutional-political arrangements and the power structures of the 
communist system. They fared best if they could find allies among powerful circles of 
the regime that used the support of workers for their own purposes. This could result 
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in divergent and dynamic constellations and tacit coalitions that impacted on the 
overall development of economic and social policy.60 
Finally, our project takes up the important insight that the working class did not form 
a unified body at all. It is hard to retrospectively analyze workers’ self-identification 
because this is clouded by a thick wall of ideological ascriptions. Collective actions of 
workers were often concentrated around individual factories and there were few cases 
of trans-local activism (the emergence and rapid growth of the Solidarność movement 
in Poland is a rare case in point). There were important cleavages among the industrial 
workers during state socialism which sometimes resulted in antagonistic relations: 
“old”, well established workers detested new recruits who were seen as more liable to 
accept communist-style forms of production and to do overwork for material and non-
material incentives, while established workers had acquired knowledge how to resist 
impositions by the management.61 Skilled workers used the dependence of the man-
agement on their work for defending their privileges, sometimes to the disadvantage of 
unskilled workers.62 Male workers did not greet with enthusiasm the promotion of fe-
male workers.63 Another major divide was between urban workers and rural workers 
who often maintained close connections with farming; especially in the late industrializ-
ing countries a significant percentage of workers can be classified as peasant-workers. 
The nature of the industry made also an important difference as for the bargaining pow-
er of workers: those who worked in politically sensitive branches had more options than 
those who worked in marginal industries. A qualified male worker in a large steel or 
machine factory in a large city was in a better place to negotiate concessions than an 
unqualified female worker in a textile factory in a village. 
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Why do we nevertheless use the concept of class, despite the mentioned differentia-
tions within this presumed group? First of all, we use “class” for the lack of better alter-
natives. But there is also a more substantial argument: memories of former industrial 
workers reveal a self-identification as “worker” and the construction of a community of 
fate by this name. Workers often position themselves against non-workers and describe 
their experiences as part of a collective story. As E. P. Thompson stressed in his seminal 
“The Making of the English Working Class,” class is something that happens during a 
process; it constitutes a relationship and a set of ideas, not a structure or category.64  
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4   Kremikovci and Elbasan: Two steel giants in comparison 
The economic policies of communist governments displayed a distinctive trend towards 
achieving autarky. Each of them intended to build a national base of heavy industry. 
The production of steel played an important role in these strategies, not least because 
communists regarded the steel industry an embodiment of modernity and the fundament 
of further industrial progress. Steel also represented a variety of values in which the 
communists fervently believed. Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili’s nom de guerre, 
Stalin, added further symbolic power to steel. Bulgaria and Albania were no exceptions. 
In 1958, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) decided 
to build a large steel plant in the outskirts of Sofia near the village of Kremikovci.65 
The new factory was thought to produce the amounts of steel deemed necessary for 
Bulgaria’s further industrialization and infrastructure development. It was part of the 
Bulgarian “Great Leap Forward” propagated by the party leadership at that time, 
which amounted to a renewal of massive investments in industry. The factory was 
also to create jobs in order to erase urban unemployment, which had appeared in the 
late 1950s. From the very beginning, this industrial endeavor was attributed cultural 
functions as well: the ruling communists hoped that the new factory would contribute 
to the making of the socialist worker and to giving Sofia, the capital city, a more pro-
letarian outlook. The motivations of the Albanian communists were similar. In 1964, 
the Fifth Congress of the Party of Labor of Albania passed the decision to build the 
country’s first steel plant, which was to be located near the town of Elbasan in central 
Albania. In Albania even more so than in Bulgaria, this decision reflected the party’s 
aim at achieving economic autarky: Albania had broken with the Soviet Union in 
1961 and was economically isolated from both East and West. The foundation of its 
own steel industry was, therefore, imperative because the country could not, or did 
not want to, import steel. 
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Our project focuses on the workers in these two enterprises. Yet, their situation and 
their relations to the management cannot be understood if the economic development of 
the factories and their political context are ignored. The significance of national politics 
for the steel plants is evinced by the fact that their directors were also members of the par-
ty’s Central Committee and directly answered to its Politburo. Hajredin Çeliku, director of 
the Elbasan factory since 1981, was even member of the Albanian Politburo.66 Political 
developments, even the foreign policies of the governments, had direct effects on work-
place relations. A case in point is the external orientation of Bulgaria and Albania: Bulgar-
ia relied heavily on Soviet support (loans, machinery, and technical specialists) for the 
construction of the Kremikovci plant, even though the Soviets doubted its economic via-
bility.67 Consequently, propaganda praised the “Metallurgical Complex Kremikovci” as a 
symbol of the “eternal friendship” between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, manifested in 
1982 also by the adding of the late Soviet leader’s name to the name of the factory. This 
added another important symbolic layer to the meaning of the factory. In Albania the gov-
ernment solicited help from the PR of China, the remaining ally of Albania after its break 
with the Soviets. China sent hundreds of specialists who supported the erection of the 
plant in the 1960s. The Chinese also tested the iron ore sent by Albania for inspection. 
In 1978 the Albanian leadership broke also with the Chinese communists. The cool-
ing of relations prior to the complete break is evident in reports on the Elbasan steel 
factory, which detailed the economic damage of alleged Chinese “sabotage”. Before the 
eventual break between the countries, the local interaction in Elbasan between the Al-
banians and the Chinese was increasingly fraught with difficulties. The cessation of 
economic support from the PR of China caused severe disturbances in the Albanian 
economy and the Elbasan steel plant as well. This forced the management, under close 
surveillance by the government, to seek contacts with western firms, e.g. the “Salzgitter 
AG” in Germany, in search for expertise. It is an irony that the technical demands of a 
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major instrument in the pursuit of autarky, i.e., the steel plant in Elbasan, forced the 
Albanian leadership to seek contacts with a capitalist country. 
The Bulgarians were faced with similarly paradoxical results. While thanks to 
Kremikovci they accomplished their goal of self-reliance in steel production, the plant’s 
insatiable demand for resources created new external dependencies. The iron ore deposits 
in Kremikovci, which had been the prime reason for the location of the factory, proved to 
be insufficient. The Bulgarians were, therefore, forced to import iron ore from the Soviet 
Union and other countries. They also had to buy coke abroad, which was required for the 
production of steel, because Bulgaria did not possess its own bituminous coal deposits for 
the production of coke. Now, the location of the plant far away from the nearest port 
turned into a major disadvantage, which was compounded by the notorious unreliability of 
the Bulgarian railways, which transported ore and coke from Burgas at the Black Sea to 
Kremikovci. The plan to build a channel from the Danube to Sofia was not realized. Aside 
from that, the technology of production in Kremikovci was outdated and was hardly mod-
ernized during the 1970s and 1980s. Eventually, the productivity of Kremikovci was low-
er than that of the older and smaller steel plant in the Bulgarian town of Pernik, which had 
been founded before World War Two. Nevertheless, thanks to its size, Kremikovci pro-
duced more steel than the Bulgarian economy would need. So, the factory sought to sell 
its products on foreign markets. However, the quality of its steel was so low that it could 
be marketed abroad only at very low prices which were below the costs of production. 
The state would finance the difference, which is why Kremikovci continued to swallow up 
a significant part of the total industrial investment in Bulgaria. When all costs are factored 
in, it would have been cheaper for Bulgaria to buy Soviet steel instead of producing its 
own.68 Today’s memories of Kremikovci as one of the biggest nails in the coffin of the 
Bulgarian socialist economy are not much beyond the point, although former workers of 
Kremikovci deplore its bad image. 
The economic development of the factory in Elbasan has not been reconstructed 
yet. From our exploratory analysis of archival evidence it seems that problems were 
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similar – if not more severe – to the ones in Kremikovci. In the mid-1980s, for exam-
ple, the Elbasan plant struggled to receive enough raw materials (iron ore, nickel) 
from domestic suppliers who preferred to export these commodities. Production al-
most came to a standstill in the late 1980s; workers remember that they were often 
idle. The efficiency of the plant was low as well, if compared to western steel facto-
ries.69 However, neither the Kremikovci nor the Elbasan steel plant followed an ex-
clusively or even predominantly economic rationale. They were ascribed by the party-
state many other equally important social, political and cultural functions. Therefore, 
party and government, which were well aware of the economic inefficiencies of these 
factories, were ready to commit further resources to keep them afloat. They were also 
ready to accept enormous pollution of air and soil – another notorious feature that 
unites Kremikovci and Elbasan and that has left a lasting imprint on the public per-
ception of the two plants. 
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5   Work in the Kremikovci and Elbasan steel factories 
In order to understand what it meant to be a worker in the two factories, and how daily 
work and life were shaped by political and economic conditions, the genealogy of the 
workforce and their everyday labor practices need to be reconstructed. Particularly re-
vealing is the investigation of those fields of interaction, where policies and agendas of 
the party-state and its divergent institutions, of the management, and of the workers 
intersected. In the following, we will therefore present first results of our analysis of 
three major problems: (1) the patterns of the recruitment and of the composition of the 
workforce, (2) the problem of labor discipline and (3) the integrative function of the 
steel plants. 
 
5.1   Recruitment of workers and composition of the workforce 
A common challenge to the management of both factories was the recruitment of work-
ers. This is an important question also because recruitment, and concomitantly the so-
cial and geographic background of workers, was a prime factor for the differentiation of 
the workforce. Furthermore, the difficulties to recruit workers is yet another indicator 
for the gulf between political intentions and results: despite being so highly cherished 
by propaganda and despite offering material privileges, the two steel plants found it 
difficult to attract and retain workers. 
The analysis of recruitment offers insight into the realities of the internal mobility 
regime that was in place in both countries. The governments of Bulgaria and Albania 
had imposed restrictions on internal mobility in order to stem the rural exodus. In Bul-
garia the government introduced new restrictions on the relocation to Sofia in the early 
1950s, which in 1955 were extended to other large cities and later to smaller ones as 
well.70 In Albania the movement from one place of residence to another was dependent 
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on permission by the authorities because the government wanted to prevent the depopu-
lation of the rural areas. In the early 1960s the flood of rural migrants was, indeed, prac-
tically stemmed in Albania.71 Unfortunately, it is very difficult to reconstruct the legal 
framework governing mobility in Albania because, as Örjan Sjöberg notes, most laws, 
decrees and other legal rules were not made public after the Fifth Party Congress in 
1966.72 Sjöberg could nonetheless identify several concrete measures of the Albanian 
government, by which they tried to reign in the rural exodus. 
From the overall demographic development of Bulgaria and Albania it appears that 
the Albanian regime was much more consistent in enforcing these administrative re-
strictions on mobility, although it did not manage to fully implement them as well. De-
spite an ongoing trend of urbanization, the majority of the population of Albania con-
tinued to live in the countryside, whereas in Bulgaria the rural-urban distribution was 
reversed. According to official Albanian statistics, the share of the population residing 
in rural areas increased from 20 percent in 1950 to 36 percent in 1989, while in Bulgaria 
it grew from 30 to 67 percent.73 
The recruitment practices of the Kremikovci plant help to explain why in Bulgaria, 
despite legal restrictions, the rural exodus continued almost unabated in the 1960s. One 
of the main motives to take work in Kremikovci was the granting of a residence permit 
(žitelstvo) in Sofia. Thanks to its political leverage and the priority status that it enjoyed 
in the eyes of the government the Kremikovci factory faced no difficulties to get resi-
dency permits from the city authorities for its newly recruited workers. Many workers 
took work in Kremikovci only for that purpose, and left the factory after some time in 
order to find a job in the city of Sofia proper. This practice was one of the underlying 
factors of the continuously high rate of labor turnover in Kremikovci: in the early 
1970s, for example, between 16 and 18 percent of the workforce left the factory each 
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year. Between 1971 and 1975, the plant hired 17,492 workers, while 13,950 left it.74 
Since many of the new workers came from villages, the authorities and the management 
continued to deplore the low level of qualification of the workforce. 
Even though the mobility restrictions were much more vigorously enforced by the 
Albanian regime, the investigation of recruitment practices by the Elbasan steel plant 
reveals divergent practices. In general, the Albanian communists tried to strictly divide 
the labor force into an urban and a rural component. Sjöberg writes that 
Moreover, labour legislation appears to prescribe a strict divorce of new entrants to the 
labour ‘market’ along the lines of rural or urban origin and place of residence. Thus, the 
rural youth are expected to take up jobs in the rural sector (…), whereas urban youth re-
mains the pool from which the urban labour force is replenished.75 
Yet, the same author already assumed that these strict rules were not always enforced 
because they contradicted other important political goals, such as the achievement of 
production targets and the maintenance of high employment levels. Sjöberg also sus-
pected that Albanian enterprises as well practiced a strategy of hoarding resources and 
sought additional labor beyond what the central planning authorities had allocated to 
them.76 Archival evidence indeed shows that the Elbasan steel plant circumvented the 
mobility restrictions in place. The factory had no choice but to resort to informal prac-
tices if it wanted to reach the employment level necessary for plan fulfillment. A 1977 
report of the State Commission for Planning, which was responsible for the allocation 
of workers to enterprises, stated that various enterprises in Elbasan recruited, in viola-
tion of the existing rules, workers from the countryside, although there were enough 
unemployed in the town.77 The Elbasan steel plant employed workers who came from 
collective farms, although they had not been granted a permission to work in the factory 
by the head of their farm. Another practice of the factory was to employ workers from 
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the countryside on temporary contracts even after their contracts had expired.78 Many 
workers from villages accepted a job in the Elbasan steel plant in the hope to receive an 
urban residence permit and a significant number of them left the factory soon: in the 
first eleven months of 1973, for example, 1,378 workers left the plant.79 The informal 
and illegal recruitment by the “Steel of the Party” factory helps to explain why the pop-
ulation of the town of Elbasan significantly increased in the 1970s (from 39,100 in 1969 
to 62,400 ten years later). Elbasan also consistently recorded higher numbers of rural 
migrants who lived in the town without permission than Tirana.80 
Yet despite the fact that workers from villages took a job in the two steel plants for 
the reason to receive residence permits in Sofia and Elbasan respectively, and despite 
the circumvention of existing rules for recruitment by the factory managements, both 
factories found it very difficult to recruit enough workers. In Kremikovci, wages for 
workers were fifteen to eighteen percent higher than standard wages in Bulgarian indus-
try, and workers could earn a twenty-five percent premium for the “fulfillment of the 
plan.”81 Yet, “Sofia residents avoided working there as if it were plague-infected” (Mi-
chael Palairet).82 Work in Kremikovci seemed unappealing to many, because working 
conditions were hard and it took a rather long and often not very reliant commute from 
downtown Sofia to the plant. Sofia residents preferred white collar jobs. The above 
mentioned numbers for labor turnover also make clear that recruitment was a constant 
problem because each year the factory had to find replacements for thousands of work-
ers who had left. 
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In the 1970s the Bulgarian government, therefore, introduced special measures to re-
cruit workers for their showpiece factory.83 Teams of recruiters, for example, went to vil-
lages of the Turkish minority to find workers; in 1974, more than thirty percent of workers 
in an important production line belonged to an ethnic minority.84 The enterprise also hired 
more than 500 contract workers from Vietnam. In 1973 the government decreed that army 
recruits would be dispensed from service, if they signed a work contract for at least five 
years of un-interrupted work in Kremikovci, and in 1974 the Politburo sent an additional 
1,500 army recruits into the factory.85 As a result of this continuous recruitment of new 
workers, a large percentage of the workers came from the village: according to a 1974 
trade-union report more than half of all workers in Kremikovci were of rural origins.86 In 
interviews taken in our project, former workers of the factory remember few co-workers 
who hailed from Sofia. It seems that common origins and kinship bonds attracted further 
co-villagers – a pattern known also from industrialization in nineteenth century England. 
One author, who had worked in Kremikovci, wrote that “I learned that in one brigade in 
the mechanical repair factory kinsmen and neighbors gathered.”87 
The same author also provided a positive interpretation of the rural recruitment: “The 
people came from villages (…), they entered into the working class, they made them-
selves benevolent persons.”88 This notion of the transformative power of industrial work 
on the self and of the creation of socialist subjectivity through work in a factory is a 
recurrent motive in the proletarian literature of that time.89 In an ironic twist the ideolo-
gy of the cathartic effect of industrial work had an equivalent in real life because 
Kremikovci, due to its difficulties to recruit workers, did offer an opportunity for people 
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with “problematic pasts”. The factory hired convicted criminals and people with ques-
tionable political credentials. In the recently opened archive of the state-security we 
found an interesting example:90 Stoian H. R., a worker in Kremikovci, was questioned 
by the secret police in 1963 for reasons that we do not know. He had worked in the “so-
cialist town” of Dimitrovgrad at the end of the 1940s, when this new town was being 
built. Then, he fled to Turkey and in 1951 he moved on to Brazil. In 1957, after the end 
of Stalinism and an amnesty, he came back to Bulgaria. In 1961 he was sentenced to 
one and a half years of imprisonment because of habitual drunkenness. After his release 
from the work camp in Belene, he went to his family in Kazanlŭk and then started to 
work in the town of Gabrovo. After that he took a job in Kremikovci. While this most 
certainly is an idiosyncratic case, it can be taken as an indicator of the fact that the 
shortage of labor, which the Bulgarian economy experienced in general and the 
Kremikovci steel plant in particular, created job opportunities also for people whose 
past put them under the risk of social exclusion. 
The Elbasan steel plant found it also hard to recruit enough workers. Their problems 
were, of course, compounded by the tough restrictions on domestic mobility and by the 
regime’s policy to centrally allocate workers to enterprises. The State Commission for 
Planning set for all the country’s districts the number of workers that they had to send to 
specific enterprises. A firm was allowed to recruit workers from other districts only if 
there were no workers available in their own district. Yet, because of poor coordination 
and frequent confusion in the dealings of institutions at different levels, districts often 
did not send the required number of workers or they sent people, which local authorities 
considered a problem but were unfit for industrial work. The Elbasan steel factory suf-
fered from that, while it faced growing plan targets as for production. In 1974, for ex-
ample, the factory failed to achieve the plan because it had not been provided with 
enough workers from several districts.91 In the 1970s, the factory directly hired hun-
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dreds of conscripts after they had finished military service. It was especially difficult to 
recruit from among better qualified urban workers who were apparently loath to accept 
such a physically demanding job in a steel factory, which is why the majority of work-
ers had little formal training. Labor fluctuation did exist in Albania as well, though most 
likely to a lesser extent than in Bulgaria. The state planning commission, at least, de-
plored “uncontrolled fluctuations” which posed a threat to the recruitment and qualifica-
tion of workers.92 There is also evidence that the Elbasan factory employed people from 
“problematic” families, even though discrimination of individuals because of their fami-
ly’s history remained a fact of life in Albania until the very end of communism. 
The continuous inflow of new workers into the factory had significant consequences 
for the composition of the workforce: on the one hand, there was a more or less stable 
core workforce; on the other hand, a significant share of the workforce remained in the 
factory only for few years. In Elbasan labor turnover was lower than in Kremikovci but 
still significant. We are, therefore, interested in the relationship between these two cate-
gories of workers: research on other state socialist industries suggests that this differ-
ence was a potential source of tension among workers. “Old” workers knew the routines 
of production and even though they did bend factory rules, they generally seemed to 
have had an interest in maintaining production and developed a proletarian ethos.93 
Workers coming directly from the villages, however, often disrupted production and left 
their workplace without giving notice, which reflected badly on the production figures 
of the smallest units of work organization. To understand these relations, the basic work 
units and their role for the integration of new workers and their socialization into the 
unwritten codes of workers’ behavior need to be explored. In Bulgaria, work was orga-
nized in brigades which gave groups of workers some leeway in organizing their work. 
Reports on the impact of financial incentives for plan fulfillment suggest a high degree 
of solidarity among brigades, that shared premiums on equal terms rather than allocat-
ing them according to individual effort. Brigades even used the additional money 
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earned in “socialist competition” to throw parties, much to the disgust of the authorities, 
who had intended to stimulate individual competition by providing financial incen-
tives.94 The workers’ sense of egalitarianism proved resilient in face of regime-
sponsored attempts to increase competition. 
Archival documents suggest various other lines of differentiation among the work-
force (gender, qualification, blue collar vs. white collar, and so on) which points to the 
heterogeneity of the working class even in one factory. This is another reason why the 
micro-cosmos of a factory is an apt social site to explore state socialist societies which 
were anything but uniform and equal. 
 
5.2   Labor discipline 
A recurrent theme in management and government reports about the workforce in 
Kremikovci and – to a lesser extent – in Elbasan, and also in interviews taken with for-
mer workers is labor discipline; or to be more precise, the lack thereof. 
In Bulgaria, reports identified workers from the villages and from the minorities – the 
latter usually belonged also to the first category – as the worst offenders of the work-code, 
as measured by unexcused absences. In Kremikovci leaders of factory units and the man-
agement were apparently lenient to take strong measures against violators of labor disci-
pline.95 This can be explained by their fear to alienate workers who would then possibly 
leave the factory for good. Given the difficulty to find adequate replacements, it was a 
rational strategy of the management to accept a certain degree of violations of labor disci-
pline in order not to offend workers by a heavy-handed approach. The room for sanctions 
by the management against workers, who regularly came late, left early, drank on their 
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work-place, took overtly long breaks, etc., was also limited by interventions of the trade 
union and party organizations in the factory. The government, for example, deplored that 
the trade union officials, rather than fighting properly again slack discipline, “took the 
incorrect position with respect to the punishment of undisciplined workers.”96 The 
Kremikovci factory regularly fired workers for the violation of labor discipline (though 
not many). Yet, those who had been fired stood a good chance to be reinstated after the 
intervention of the party and / or trade union committee in the factory. Neither the party 
nor the trade union would light-heartedly take a stance against workers on the grass-root 
level. They also conceded that many cases of violations of labor discipline were not 
caused by bad character or laziness but by shortcomings of the system: the lack of goods, 
inadequate working and living conditions, irregular transportation, and other typical fea-
tures of the Bulgarian socialist economy were often to blame for the violation of factory 
rules.97 Many workers of the Kremikovci iron ore mine, for example, left up to an hour 
early every day in order to catch the 4:20 p.m. bus to Sofia.98 Of course, there were also 
workers who really exploited the constraints on the management in firing them and who 
left the factory, for example, in the early afternoon to see a football game in Sofia. 
Information on labor discipline in the Elbasan steel plant is much sketchier. In gen-
eral, it can be assumed that workers enjoyed less tolerance by the authorities than in 
Bulgaria. Yet this assumption is until now inferred only from our general knowledge 
about the much more repressive nature of the Albanian regime, which was the most 
dictatorial among the European communist regimes. Thanks to its secretive character 
the regime produced little information (even a statistical yearbook was not regularly 
published). However, frequent articles about a lack of discipline and other forms of 
“wrong” behavior in the local newspaper of Elbasan, Shkumbini, can be seen as evi-
dence of the existence of these phenomena. The newspaper regularly published letters 
and articles by “voluntary” correspondents who deplored various problems in the facto-
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ry, such as the fact that workers often appeared late at their work place. Frequent leaves 
for illness also attracted critique and suspicion by the newspaper. 
The official explanation of such behavior in Albania, though, was markedly different 
from that in Bulgaria. Reports of the Bulgarian authorities and the Kremikovci manage-
ment describe violations of labor discipline usually as the result of undue behavior by in-
dividual workers, who were lazy or politically unconscious, and who might exercise a bad 
effect on fellow workers. They also conceded, as mentioned above, that shortcomings in 
the organization of work and in the economy sometimes made the observance of factory 
rules impossible. In Albania in contrast, violations of the factory code are usually ex-
plained as politically motivated “sabotage” and as instances of the malign offensive of the 
imperialist forces against Albania. So, the ideological framing of violations of labor disci-
pline was markedly different in Bulgaria and Albania. The Albanian communist mounted 
heavy guns against this phenomenon, which politicized it even stronger. Violations of 
labor discipline became part of an overarching discourse of a country being permanently 
threatened by outside forces. We assume that this language reduced the room of maneuver 
of the management: it became much more risky to take a lenient approach towards work-
ers, if their “misbehavior” was described as a mortal danger to Albania. 
 
5.3   Socialist integration 
The ideological framing of workers’ practices is an important topic of our research project 
because it not only reveals the official perception of the working class but shaped also the 
self-identification of workers. The steel plants in Kremikovci and Elbasan were major 
sites of socialist socialization into which the party-state invested not only a lot of financial 
and political capital but also symbolic meaning. The breadth of ideological literature and 
the prominent role of the two enterprises and their workers in the self-image of the re-
gimes are evidence of the significance attributed by communist power to these two facto-
ries. While communist ideology did not directly translate into workers consciousness and 
self-identification, it did leave traces, which becomes evident also in the nostalgic memo-
ries about that time by workers. Festivities in the enterprise, official praise and awards for 
their workers, rituals of community and other performative acts as well as the patterns of 
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labor produced arenas of legitimacy. The probably most effective force of creating con-
sents was the way, how production was organized, because this touched the daily routines 
of workers and directly impacted on their level of life satisfaction. 
In most of our interviews with (former) workers of the Kremikovci and Elbasan steel 
plants strong identification with work in the factory is evident. Galina Petrova T., for 
example, worked various jobs from 1980 to 2001 in Kremikovci (as assistant of an elec-
trical engineer, dispatcher, fitter, machine operator). While she is generally a taciturn 
respondent, she perks up when being asked about her concrete work, which she de-
scribes in great detail. She stresses how hard her work was and how often she was 
forced to cope with unforeseen problems, but she obviously gained self-confidence 
from overcoming these difficulties. She presents herself as having agency. This reflects 
the particularity of the organization of production in large industrial enterprises during 
state socialism: production was relatively inefficient (not to be compared with Fordist 
principles of the organization of work, not to mention post-Fordist just-in-time produc-
tion), also due to outdated technology. Machines often broke down, labor processes 
were often not thoroughly standardized and the supply with materials was irregular. In 
such a production environment, the maintenance of production often depended on the 
effort and creativity of workers. This model of production depended on generalists, i.e., 
workers who managed to fix different things. These workers executed more than the 
same physical motion all over again. From the point of view of workers, this pattern of 
production gave them more leeway in determining how they would use their time, at 
least as long as production targets were met. They felt to have some agency in the facto-
ry and to make things. As far as the mentioned respondent is concerned, there is another 
moment which explains her strong identification with her former work: women espe-
cially felt that industrial work, despite all the drudgery, did have a liberating effect.99 
There was another important aspect of the workers’ opportunities to fashion daily 
work: at least for the Bulgarian case study, there is evidence that workers appropriated 
resources by the factory for their own private purposes either for moonlighting or for 
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personal needs. This pattern corroborates findings from other state socialist countries. 
The management, and even the government, put a blind eye on these practices, as long 
as workers kept some restraint, although these constituted theft of “socialist property” 
which was a severe crime. Yet, this was one incentive that the management could con-
cede to its workers, and the immediate economic effects were seen positively by the 
regime. Informal economic activities filled some of the many wholes of the formal 
economy, especially with regard to the poor level of its service sector. By that, re-
sources were used – though in a different than originally planned way – which other-
wise would not have been exploited. In an ironic twist, this arrangement also strength-
ened the accommodation of workers with the regime, because they got a sense to be 
able to trick and work the system.  
At the same time, the opportunities to shape one’s own work and to use resources of the 
employer for private purposes were unequally distributed among the workers. Here again 
one sees the differences between the situation of workers in a large, important enterprise 
and those in small, less important ones. The latter usually had less access to these opportu-
nities. To put it bluntly: a qualified, typically male steel worker in Kremikovci had more 
bargaining power than a female worker at a conveyer belt in a small textile factory in a 
village. 
Another recurrent theme in interviews with workers of formerly socialist enterprises is 
the sense of comradeship that many of them express. It is quite common that in oral narra-
tives, co-workers are presented as a second family.100 These nostalgic reflections are, of 
course, shaped by the experience of atomization, social decline and dissolution of networks 
experienced by many (former) workers after the end of socialism. Yet, they express also 
pre-1989 experiences, as shaped by the perception of social action at the time of both expe-
rience and speaking. Co-workers were an important social network, and the formal struc-
tures of power and labor organization strengthened these primary groups. The brigade or-
ganization of work in Bulgaria is a case in point. Workers also stress that, even if they had 
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disagreements and quarrels among each other, they would have never betrayed their co-
workers vis-à-vis the management. Informal relations appear to have been important in 
Albania as well. Otherwise, newspapers would not have reported on the downsides of 
strong mutual support and solidarity, such as clientelism, misappropriation of state proper-
ty, and nepotism. It will be interesting to see, how the ‘traditional’ foundations of informal 
networks in Bulgaria and Albania, such as family, kinship and locality, were transformed 
and re-shaped by the industrial experience. It is indeed striking to hear former workers in 
Bulgaria using the word “collective” when they describe their primary group at the work-
place. 
The enterprise as well as the trade union and party committees in the factory at-
tempted to foster loyalty of the workers towards the factory by various means. This in-
cluded the allocation of social benefits (such as housing and places in vacation homes), 
the provision of facilities for leisurely activities (especially for sport), and the organiza-
tion of “political-educational” and cultural events. The trade union committee in 
Kremikovci, for example, aimed at “inculcating the love of every worker, engineer and 
clerk to the giant of our heavy metallurgy.”101 The formation of class consciousness and 
collectivism, of industrial habits and discipline was another goal of the trade union’s 
educational program. However, documents from the trade unions point to the fact that 
few workers were interested in these kinds of programs and rarely signed up to them if 
not forced to do so. Yet, we nevertheless believe that the all-encompassing take of the 
factory on the workers had an impact on their habitus. Workers not only worked in the 
factory, but they took also their vacation in one of its homes, they lived in apartments 
provided by their employer, they used the factory’s leisure facilities, and they supported 
one of the factory’s sports teams. Almost the whole day – work and leisure – could be 
spent in the factory and its socio-cultural outlets. So, there was a strong material funda-
ment for workers’ identification with the factory, as it is articulated today in memories. 
There were, in any case, also limits to the readiness of workers to accommodate with 
constantly difficult living and working conditions. The archive of the Kremikovci en-
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terprise and of its trade union committee contains many complaints of workers, pictur-
ing the many problems of everyday life under communism. Workers were dissatisfied 
with their wages, with the perennial lack of housing, with poor transportation, with the 
system of distributing vouchers for the vacation homes of the factory, with their work 
clothes, with the trade union, etc. The regime struggled hard to deflect criticism and 
opened channels for critique that would not question the foundations of its power. The 
solicitation of letters of complaints and the invitation to workers to submit recommen-
dations to the management were thought to take the steam off. The introduction of 
workers’ control in Albania and of production committees, and at the end of the 1980s 
of “workers’ self-management” in Bulgaria, served the same purpose. There are, indeed, 
no indications of open protest or a walk out neither in Kremikovci nor in Elbasan. Yet, 
this was more likely the result of the fear of workers for severe consequences if they 
staged an open protest. From sociological polls taken regularly in Bulgaria in the 1980s, 
which measured workers’ opinion, we can infer a growing level of dissatisfaction of 
workers with the regime. The mechanisms of accommodating the working class appear 
to have become ever more fragile because of the growing economic problems and ideo-
logical antinomies.102 Eventually, workers were not ready to rally for the survival of 
state socialism neither in Bulgaria nor in Albania, although most of them today seem 
unhappy about its demise. 
The close look into the inner life of two major factories, thus, reveals new insights 
into the production of legitimacy in a state socialist system and its erosion. As for the 
production of legitimacy, the foundations of the always shaky legitimacy of communist 
rule should also be searched in the daily routines of work and the level of satisfaction 
that work could deliver, in terms of remuneration as well as of the sense of agency it 
made possible. For this reason, the loss of legitimacy of communist rule in the eyes of 
the workers was also closely tied to developments in the enterprises. The deterioration 
of overall economic conditions in Bulgaria and Albania in the 1980s reduced the oppor-
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tunities of the two factories to accommodate workers’ aspirations. It increased the pres-
sure on workers to engage in informal activities. The growing informality of the econ-
omy, in turn, further reduced the efficiency of production, thus strengthening the 
downward cycle of both the economy and the level of acceptance of the communist re-
gime. Attempts to rationalize or accelerate production were seen as threats to a labor 
routine which offered workers some autonomy. The gradual breakdown of production 
in Elbasan in the late 1980s, mainly due to a lack of raw material, must also have had a 
demoralizing effect. Industrial case-studies, therefore, have something to say about the 
end of communist rule as well. 
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6   Conclusions 
The comparative exploration of the history of workers in two major industrial enterprises in 
Albania and Bulgaria reveals new vistas on the creation of “worlds of meaning” in state 
socialism. We do not want to write neither the history of Albania and Bulgaria nor the 
company history of the steel plants, but of the people working in these places. How did they 
perceive and navigate their social world? Of course, in order to understand the actors we 
need to know the stage (and backstage) on which their history took place. We believe that 
the Metallurgical Complex in Kremikovci and the Steel of the Party plant in Elbasan are 
ideal case studies to understand the interrelation between social practices and political in-
tervention in state socialism. The revelatory potential of the two factories is conditioned by 
their especially salient role for the party-state and the shaping of the “socialist” working 
class. On the one hand, the two steel factories were a place of claims at legitimacy by the 
rulers and of the concrete policies that emanated from the politics of legitimation; on the 
other hand, they were a place where workers aimed to achieve some sort of autonomy and 
to find a place in a rapidly changing society. We claim that these two factories are an ideal 
place to investigate what Thomas Lindenberger has described as an important task of the 
social history of state socialism: to analyze the “interpenetration of the formal structures of 
power and of the informal relationship building” in order to explain the intricate entangle-
ment between the life-worlds on the micro level and the interventionist party-state.103 
Shop-floor relations and labor practices were social manifestations of larger power struc-
tures in state socialism. They highlighted the social quality of rule: the rulers were con-
strained by dependencies, and the ruled ones were not just the receivers of orders from 
“above.”104 
One striking factor of these two factories, which differentiates them from steel plants 
in the capitalist world at that time, was the intensity of ideological ascription to them. 
The two steel works were also sites where high ideology was translated into concrete 
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instructions. The regime’s goal was to firmly link the idea of communism with the so-
cial and cultural practices of the workers. Although we can observe also a process of the 
accommodation of ideological claims to the realities of social life and the necessities of 
production, ideology continued to matter and conditioned status ascriptions and political 
perceptions. Industrial labor and relations at the workplace were over-determined in the 
sense that they always were connected with other than just an economic rationale. There 
were differences in this regard between Bulgaria and Albania, the latter keeping to a 
much narrower ideological framework. In both countries, and consequently in the two 
enterprises in question, work – such as many other aspects of everyday life under state 
socialism – was highly politicized. Workers were encouraged to meet certain production 
goals not just for the sake of production but a variety of other reasons as well – such as 
to fight imperialism. At the same time, the party was heavily present in the factory, 
though the factory party committee’s activities were often less ideologically charged 
than the narrative of the central authorities would suggest. Still, workers were constant-
ly reminded of the political significance of what they did or failed to do. The social re-
sults of this discourse were double-edged: on the one hand, the constant reminder of the 
importance of industrial work offered workers the opportunity to strengthen their own 
claims by linking them with official ideology; on the other hand, over-politicization of 
social life undermined the legitimacy of communism in the long term. 
The stabilizing effects of ideology are evident, for example, in complaints of 
Kremikovci workers in which the adoption of important tropes of official ideology are 
common place. The highlighting of a political “correct” family background, of sound 
communist credentials, and of modest social origins belongs to the frequent rhetoric 
devices in these letters. Since industrial workers were important to the regime not only 
for ideological-propagandistic, but also economic and ultimately political reasons, the 
communist regime would not want to alienate them. The fact that the steel factories in 
Elbasan and Kremikovci ranked especially high on the political and economic agenda of 
the two regimes gave workers special bargaining power. This was further increased by 
the shortage of industrial labor thanks to full employment and, in Albania, strict mobili-
ty restrictions, which forced the management but ultimately also the government to of-
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fer certain privileges to the workers of the two show-piece factories. The nature of “so-
cialist” organization of labor on the shop-floor, with its many inefficiencies and incon-
sistencies, was another important factor in determining the room of maneuver of work-
ers: they seem to have enjoyed more possibilities to control the usage of their work time 
than in a thoroughly rationalized, just-in-time production environment. At the same 
time, this pattern of the organization of production was part of the larger economic ma-
laise of state socialism which eventually undermined the strategies of the regime to ac-
commodate industrial workers with the system. Here again, we see the contradictory 
and paradoxical effects of certain structures in state socialism. That which appeared as a 
solution at one moment, turned into a problem in the next moment. 
The investigation of relations at the workplace, thus, helps to understand and observe in 
detail both the production and the erosion of legitimacy of communist rule. It is not enough 
to point only to economic woes as the main reason why communists all over Europe lost 
power. Economic crisis is not sufficient to make citizens questioning the very foundations 
of a given political and social order. A system is on the brink of collapse when its citizens 
question the viability of the system to cope with problems and instead perceive concrete 
difficulties as symptoms of systemic contradictions. In such a situation, people refute the 
claims of the regime to represent an order rooted in morality and question the ideational 
foundations of the system. Of course, the loss of legitimacy of communist power in eastern 
and southeastern Europe has many roots and dimensions, and in each country, this process 
displayed idiosyncrasies, thanks to different social configurations and arrangements.105 
However, the over-politicization of everyday life was one major reason for the loss of legit-
imacy on a wide front. Katherine Verdery summarized that mechanism succinctly: 
The very forms of Party rule in the workplace, then, tended to focus, politicize, and turn 
against it the popular discontent that capitalist societies more successfully disperse, depo-
liticize, and deflect.106 
                                                 
105 Kenney, A carnival of revolution; Kotkin, Uncivil society. 
106 Verdery, What was socialism, and what comes next?, 23. 
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In their totalizing self-understanding – manifest in the constitutions of the Peoples’ De-
mocracies, which attributed the “leading role” in society to the communist party – the 
communists had declared themselves responsible for everything. Since much in social-
ism did not function as it should have, and shortages and other difficulties were an om-
nipresent feature of everyday life, the communists constantly risked to be made respon-
sible for all these problems. At the same time, the increasingly evident economic failure 
undermined the basic principle of the communists’ claim to legitimacy, their “goal-
rationality”.107 The clearer it became that the stated goals – such as overtaking the West 
and producing ever-increasing standards of living – would not be achieved, the shakier 
the foundations of communist legitimacy became. The work place was one of the social 
spaces where these processes crystallized and were negotiated. 
From existing research on the attitudes of industrial workers towards communist rule in 
Bulgaria, we can infer that the alienation of workers grew significantly in the 1980s.108 
Workers were not only fed up with concrete problems in their everyday life and at work 
and with the empty promises of the party, but they also did not believe that the propagated 
reform-agenda of the party would lead to genuine improvements. To the dismay of party 
officials, they took a “wait and see” approach; the party found it impossible to mobilize 
workers for its reform policies. The “dictatorship of the proletariat” lost even the outward 
expression of support from the working class in whose name the communists ruled. From 
the close examination of workers’ opinion and practices in the two steel plants we expect 
further insight into the erosion of communist rule on the level of social practice, but also 
into the adaptation of accommodation strategies at the end of communism. 
Finally it needs to be stressed that a micro-history of shop-floor relations in two gi-
ants of socialist industry reveals not only the social logic of state socialism but also the 
macro-patterns of socio-economic change. One goal of the project is to relate the story 
                                                 
107 Rigby, “Introduction: Political Legitimacyˮ, 10–1. 
108 Annual sociological surveys conducted by the research institute of the trade unions, in which thousands 
of workers across the country were polled, indicate a stark increase in workers dissatisfaction and growing 
levels of alienation from the regime in the 1980s. See Petrov, “Lebenszufriedenheit bulgarischer Arbeit-
nehmer”, 51–62; Brunnbauer, “Die sozialistische Lebensweise”, 235.  
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of the two enterprises to the wider historical context in order to learn more about the 
particularities of industrialization in Albania and Bulgaria. This ambition is driven also 
by the fact that the internal dynamics of industrial relations in the two steel works are 
entangled with the wider dynamics of change in Albania and Bulgaria, and with the 
domestic and foreign policies of the two communist regimes. The study of the two fac-
tories and of labor relations in them can help to elucidate the micro-social consequences 
of industrialization in Southeastern Europe, which have hardly been studied. The pat-
terns of interaction between workers, management, party and state officials are an in-
dispensable part of the history of everyday life during a period of rapid change. Any 
society can be understood only if the social process of its reproduction, i.e. labor, is 
explored. Industrial work is an important part of it. The working class might have been 
gone in Southeastern Europe, but its history can still be written. 
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